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Workers' Compensation

by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen'"
Katherine D. Dixon"
and
Marion Handley Martin****
For workers' compensation, the 1999-2000 survey period was largely
notable for a number of legislative changes and for another year in
which Georgia's appellate courts dealt with numerous cases interpreting
the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. As
always, however, the appellate courts also decided numerous workers'
compensation cases, with issues ranging from the "any evidence" rule to
superior court judgments.
Additional legislative activity is possible in the coming year as a
special commission appointed by Governor Barnes readies a report, due
in April 2001, on proposed changes to the workers' compensation system.
I.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

As in most other years during the last decade, the Chairman's
Advisory Committee made a number of recommendations regarding
amendments to various sections of the Workers' Compensation Act.
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Listed below is a summary of the changes made by the Legislature
during the 2000 session, all of which became effective on July 1, 2000.
A. Spousal Dependency-Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A.") section 34-9-13(b)(1)
This amendment deleted the language referencing employment of the
spouse of a deceased employee. Most households need both incomes, and
the employment of a spouse for a period of ninety days prior to the
accident should not be a determinative factor as to whether the spouse
was wholly dependent on the deceased employee. Instead, the presumption of total dependence is now rebuttable if the husband and wife lived
separately for ninety days before the accident.
B.

No-Liability Settlements-O.C.G.A. section 34-9-15

Two new subsections to the statute were added. Subsection (b) gives
the Board authority to approve fees for no-liability stipulations.
Subsection (c) addresses the problem of social security offsets in the
settlement of workers' compensation cases by allowing lump-sum
settlements to be prorated over the life expectancy of the injured worker.
C.

Late Payment of Medical Charges-O.C.G.A. section 34-9-203(c)

The Board is permitted to assess a penalty of up to twenty percent of
reasonable medical charges not paid within thirty days from the date
that the employer or insurer receives the charges along with medical
reports and forms required by the Board. Specifically, the amendment
decreased the length of time an employer or insurer may make payment
of medical charges from sixty days to thirty days.
D. Electronic Funds-O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221
This amendment allows income benefits to be paid by electronic funds
transfer.
E.

Temporary Total DisabilityMaximum--O.C.G.A. section 34-9-261

This amendment increased the maximum amount of temporary total
disability benefits from $350 per week to $375 per week, and it increased
the minimum amount of temporary total disability benefits from $35 per
week to $37.50 per week.
F Temporary PartialDisability Maximum--O.C.G.A. section 34-9262
This amendment increased the maximum amount of temporary partial
disability benefits from $233.33 to $250 per week.
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G. Death Benefit Maximum--O.C.G.A. section 34-9-265(d)
The maximum death benefit paid to a surviving spouse who is the sole
dependent at the time of death was increased from $100,000 to $125,000.
II.

EXCLUSIVE REMEDY

During the last survey period, the appellate courts devoted substantial
attention to the exclusive remedy doctrine. The court's application of the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act ("the
Act") can be categorized in three areas: (1) the protection of the coemployee; (2) the adherence to proper procedure and the penalties
thereof; and (3).the interaction between the exclusive remedy provisions
with other existing laws.
A.

The Protection of the Co-Employee

The Act expressly provides, and Georgia courts have upheld the legal
contention, that when a claimant sustains an injury in the scope of
employment by another co-employee's negligence, the co-employee is
immune from tort liability.1
In Webster v. Dodson,2 the claimant sought damages from a coemployee and Stein Mart under the theories of assault and battery and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. While fielding a store
complaint about which the claimant may have had pertinent information, the co-employee made contact with the claimant's shoulder "to get
her attention to tell her to be quiet" until the co-employee finished the
conversation with the upset customer.3 It was undisputed that the
physical contact arose during the handling of a work-related activity,
during normal working hours, and from the assigned work duties in the
furtherance of Stein Mart's business.4 Hence, the court found no
evidence to suggest that the alleged tortious act was committed for
5
personal reasons unrelated to the conduct of the employer's business.
The trial court's finding that the claim was barred by the Act was
properly adjudicated summarily.'

1. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1998).
2. 240 Ga. App. 4, 522 S.E.2d 487 (1999).
3. Id. at 5, 522 S.E.2d at 488.
4. Id. at 6, 522 S.E.2d at 489.
5. Id.; see also Johnson v. Holiday Food Stores, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 822, 824-25, 520
S.E.2d 502, 505 (1999) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate when the
evidence showed that the injuries were solely caused by the wilful act of a third person for
entirely personal reasons).
6. 240 Ga. App. at 6, 522 S.E.2d at 489.
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Subsequently, the court stood on the Webster opinion to address a
similar tort claim issue in Solis v. Lamb.' In Solis plaintiff failed to
respond to the co-employee's request for admission that the co-employee
was "acting during the course and scope of her employment at the time
of the alleged events as stated in the complaint."8 Moreover, plaintiff
"'chose not to seek the liberal remedies afforded to parties under the
statute to avoid the consequences of a failure to respond. '"'9 Therefore,
in light of the claimant's admissions, the exclusive10 remedy provisions of
the Act were triggered, and recovery was barred.
In Cotton v. Bowen," the court addressed the related issue of
whether a co-employee loses immunity if he is considered a "construction
design professional." 2 Plaintiff was an experienced operator of a
printing press that required him to "web" sheets of paper through
rollers. Plaintiff was asked to test a printing press that had been
modified and reinstalled. During the testing, plaintiff's arm was crushed
in the rollers. Plaintiff brought suit against the installers of the press
and a co-employee. 3 The court affirmed the granting of summary
judgment to the co-employee, holding the exclusive remedy provisions of
the Act barred plaintiff's tort claim." Plaintiff contended the coemployee lost his statutory protection on the ground that he was a
"'construction design professional.""' The court disagreed and held the
segment of the statute cited by plaintiff created a second category of
immune persons, rather than an exception.' 6 In its explanation, the
court relied upon language in Warden v. Hoar Construction Co." in
concluding that the statute provides immunity to co-employees and to
"persons who provide workers' compensation benefits under a contract
with the employer, and 'construction design professionals.""'
Consequently, the court held the Act provided plaintiff with his exclusive remedy.19

7. 244 Ga. App. 8, 534 S.E.2d 582 (2000).
8. Id. at 10, 534 S.E.2d at 584.
9. Id. at 9, 534 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting G.H. Bass & Co. v. Fulton County Bd.of Tax
Assessors, 268 Ga. 327, 331, 486 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1997)).
10. Id. at 9-10, 534 S.E.2d at 584.
11. 241 Ga. App. 543, 524 S.E.2d 737 (1999).
12. Id. at 545, 524 S.E.2d at 739-40.
13. Id., 524 S.E.2d at 739.
14. Id. at 545-46, 524 S.E.2d at 739-40. The co-employee's status of employment as a
co-employee was undisputed. Id. at 545, 524 S.E.2d at 739.
15. Id. at 545, 524 S.E.2d at 739 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) (1998)).
16. Id.
17. 269 Ga. 715, 507 S.E.2d 428 (1998).
18. 241 Ga. App. at 545, 524 S.E.2d at 739-40 (quoting Warden, 269 Ga. at 716, 507
S.E.2d at 429).
19. Id. at 546, 524 S.E.2d at 740.
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While the court in Webster found summary judgment was appropriate,
the court in Wade v. Georgia Diversified Industries, Inc.,2" found the
facts in this wrongful death action created genuine issues for a jury to
consider.2' In Wade the employer provided a free transportation service
for its employees.22 Participation in the service was not mandatory, nor
were the employees paid for traveling to and from work. Occasionally,
the president of the company would use his personal vehicle to transport
employees. The decedent used the free transportation service and was
paid based on his production. On the night of the fatal accident, the
decedent worked later than his normal shift and accepted a ride home
in the president's personal vehicle. After taking other employees home,
the president made the unilateral decision to return to the office. Before
reaching the office, however, they were involved in the accident.2" The
court concluded that a jury must determine whether the fatality arose
out of and in the course of the employment or whether the accident was
the unfortunate result of a co-employee's merely gratuitous ride.24
B.

The ProceduralAdherence

During the survey period, the court stressed the importance of
procedure and protocol. In Maguire v. Dominion Development Corp.,2'
plaintiff formed a partnership with two of his relatives and began to
work at a construction site under a general contractor. While working,
plaintiff injured his back and foot when the scaffolding where he was
standing collapsed. Plaintiff brought suit against the general contractor
for negligence. In turn, the general contractor sought immunity under
the exclusive remedy doctrine. The trial court affirmed the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") finding that plaintiff was not an "employee" of
the general contractor, but rather was an immediate employee of the
partnership he created with his two relatives. As a result, O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-8 required plaintiff to seek benefits from the partnership
before pursuing a claim against a statutory employer. Because plaintiff
did not do so, the general contractor did not pay workers' compensation
benefits.26 Moreover, the court clarified that "statutory employers also

20. 240 Ga. App. 225, 522 S.E.2d 746 (1999).
21. Id. at 228, 522 S.E.2d at 748.
22. Id. at 225-26, 522 S.E.2d at 747. The court distinguished Jose Andrade Painting
v. Jaimes, 207 Ga. App. 596, 428 S.E.2d 640 (1993), because the facts before the court
authorized the inference that the claimant's injuries occurred in the course of transportation supplied by the employer. 240 Ga. App. at 227, 522 S.E.2d at 748.
23. 240 Ga. App. at 226, 522 S.E.2d at 747.
24. Id., 522 S.E.2d at 747-48.
25. 241 Ga. App. 715, 527 S.E.2d 575 (1999).
26. Id. at 716-17, 527 S.E.2d at 576-77.
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enjoy tort immunity even if they do not pay a claim."27 The court
forcefully remarked that it would not "allow injured workers to
circumvent a statutory employer's tort immunity by intentionally failing
to file a claim against his immediate employer.""
In Sam's Wholesale Club v. Riley, 9 the court addressed the impact
that a default judgment and the absence of a lower court's transcript
have when an appellate court reviews a dispute involving the exclusive
remedy provisions."0 In this case plaintiff sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and attempts to commit
physical injuries. The employer, Sam's Wholesale Club ("Sam's"), fell
into default judgment. The trial court denied Sam's motions to dismiss,
set aside, and open default judgment. Particularly, Sam's argued that
plaintiff was precluded from recovery under tort liability because of the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Act."1 The court concluded that
because no transcript of the evidence was presented at the hearing of
damages and because the allegations of the complaint were deemed
supported by proper evidence by virtue of the default judgment, it was
unable to review the issue and had to presume the trial court's findings
were proper."
Moreover, the court reiterated that a plaintiff may
bring an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and it
would not be barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act. 3
C.

Other Laws and Their Effect on the Exclusive Remedy

This year the courts have addressed how other laws coexist and
interplay with the exclusive remedy doctrine. In SCI LiquidatingCorp.
v. Hartford Insurance Co., 4 the Georgia Supreme Court handled a
certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on the
"issue of whether a Title VII sexual harassment claim can be construed
as 'arising out of and in the course of employment'" as it relates to the

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 241 Ga. App. 693, 527 S.E.2d 293 (1999).
30. Id. at 697, 527 S.E.2d at 297.
31. Id. at 694-97, 527 S.E.2d at 295-97.
32. Id. at 697, 527 S.E.2d at 297; see also Atwood v. Southeast Bedding Co., 236 Ga.
App. 116, 116, 511 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1999) (stating when an appellant omits the transcript
from the record on appeal, an appellate court must assume the judgment below was
correct).
33. 241 Ga. App. at 697, 527 S.E.2d at 297; see also Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, 209 Ga.
App. 703, 704, 434 S.E.2d 500, 500 (1993) (stating intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act when injuries are of
a physical nature).
34. 272 Ga. 293, 526 S.E.2d 555 (2000).
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interpretation of a clause in a commercial contract.3 5 In this case,
Sunrise Carpet Industries ("SCI") filed suit in federal court to recover
from its insurance carrier damages SCI paid to three former employees
as a result of a sexual harassment suit."6 Hartford Insurance Companies denied the claim on the ground that the policies issued expressly
excluded claims made by SCI employees for personal injuries "arising
out of and in the course of employment."37 Subsequently, the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia found the policies covered the
sexual harassment claims against SCI and granted summary judgment
in favor of SCI. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the summary adjudication and certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court.3"
The court announced it would adopt the workers' compensation
interpretation of the terms "in the course of' and "arising out of"
employment as they relate to a commercial liability insurance contract.39 Furthermore, the court articulated that "sexual harassment
claims have been held not to 'arise out of' employment, even though they
occur 'in the course of' employment."" Hence, the court held that in
this case the sexual harassment suffered by the former employees was
not a proximate result of a risk of employment that a reasonable person
could have foreseen due to the nature of the work.41 Therefore, the
contested clause did not exclude coverage.42
In dissent, Justice Fletcher argued that the "use of workers' compensation law to guide the interpretation of a contract not involving workers'
compensation is inappropriate."4 3 More explicitly, he wrote that the
concerns involving the state imposed workers' compensation system
"have no place in interpreting private contracts."" Based on these
particular facts, the dissent pointed out that the policy contained a
specific exclusion for workers' compensation claims, and it would be
"illogical and redundant to incorporate workers' compensation law into
the exclusion."4 5 Furthermore, the primary issue was not whether the
sexual harassment was within the scope of an employee's duties, but

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 293, 526 S.E.2d at 556.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 294, 526 S.E.2d at 556-57.
Id., 526 S.E.2d at 557.
Id.
Id. at 295, 526 S.E.2d at 557.

43.

Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).

44. Id., 526 S.E.2d at 557-58.
45. Id.
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whether the claims arose out of and in the course of employment.
Justice Fletcher concluded they did.4"
Moreover, the court revisited Georgia Power Co. v. FrancoRemodeling
Co.47 on remand in light of the Georgia Supreme Court's reversal of

48
Flint Electric Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Construction Co. and
49
City of Dalton v. Gene Rogers Construction Co. In FrancoRemodeling

Co. I the court was bound to hold the High-voltage Safety Act did not
50
create an exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. In

Franco Remodeling Co. II," however, the court held the indemnity
provision of the High-voltage Safety Act may be enforced without
disturbing the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.52 Similar to the exception outlined in Flint Electric Membership Corp., this exception is very limited.5
Subsequently, in Stephens v. Harbor Club, Inc.,5 4 the court briefly
addressed the interplay of ERISA as it relates to the Act.55 The court

held ERISA does not preempt an action for fraud concerning workers'
Additionally, in a footnote, the court found
compensation benefits.
plaintiff's action was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of
the Act because the torts alleged did not arise out of and were not in the
course of her employment. 57 The court noted that the intentional
misconduct of the employer after the injuries were sustained spawned
the workers' compensation claim. 8
III.

CASES

Any Evidence
As usual, Georgia's appellate courts heard more than one "any
evidence" case on appeal. The case law is well settled that the State
Board of Workers' Compensation ("the Board") is the fact finder in
workers' compensation cases, and if there is any evidence to support the

A.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
233 Ga. App. 640, 505 S.E.2d 488 (1998).
229 Ga. App. 838, 495 S.E.2d 136 (1997).
223 Ga. App. 819, 479 S.E.2d 171 (1996).
233 Ga. App. at 643, 505 S.E.2d at 490.
240 Ga. App. 771, 525 S.E.2d 152 (1999).
Id. at 771, 525 S.E.2d at 153.
229 Ga. App. at 838-40, 495 S.E.2d at 136-38.
244 Ga. App. 384, 535 S.E.2d 256 (2000).
Id. at 384-85, 535 S.E.2d at 257-58.
Id. at 385, 535 S.E.2d at 258.
Id. at 385-86 n.1, 535 S.E.2d at 258 n.1.
Id. at 384-85, 535 S.E.2d at 257.
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Board's award, the evidence must be construed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party.5"
In Columbus FireDepartment/ColumbusConsolidatedGovernment v.
Ledford,"° the court of appeals determined that post-traumatic stress
disorder suffered by a firefighter would not qualify as an "injury" under
the Act.6 ' The firefighter failed to prove to the AIJ and the appellate
division that his psychological problems arose out of an accident in
which a compensable physical injury was sustained.6 2 "[A] psychological injury is compensable only 'if it arises naturally and unavoidably...
from some discernible physical occurrence.'"63 Although the Board
determined the employee's psychological condition was the result of
witnessing severe injuries and deaths in fires and automobile accidents,
the Board concluded the employee failed to persuasively establish his
psychological condition was causally related to a physical injury
sustained on the job.64
In an attempt-to find a physical injury to connect to the employee's
psychological condition, the superior court reversed the Board, pointing
to evidence of an episode of smoke inhalation suffered by the employee.
The superior court issued an order finding the Board had applied an
erroneous standard of law requiring the physical injury precipitate
and/or cause the employee's psychological disability.6 5
The court of appeals accepted the case on discretionary appeal and
reversed the superior court, pointing out the record contained evidence
to support the Board's findings. 6 The court stated: "Even assuming
that Ledford's psychological problems emanated from 'revolting
employment related experience[s]' that caused the ensuing psychological
injury, such an injury is not compensable" without the compensable

59. Atlas Automotive, Inc. v. Wilson, 225 Ga. App. 631,633,484 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1997);
Gleaton v. Hazelwood Farms, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 825, 826, 449 S.E.2d 170, 171 (1994).
60. 240 Ga. App. 195, 523 S.E.2d 58 (1999).
61. Id. at 197-98, 523 S.E.2d at 61.
62. Id. at 197, 523 S.E.2d at 61.
In order for a psychological injury to be compensable, it must satisfy two
conditions precedent: (1) it must arise out of an accident in which a compensable
physical injury was sustained; and (2) while the physical injury need not be the
precipitating cause of the psychological condition or problems, at a minimum, the
physical injury must contribute to the continuation of the psychological trauma.
Id. See Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88, 495 S.E.2d 13 (1998); Southwire Co. v.
George, 266 Ga. 739, 470 S.E.2d 865 (1996).
63. 240 Ga. App. at 197, 523 S.E.2d at 61 (quoting Southwire Co., 266 Ga. at 741, 470
S.E.2d at 865).
64. Id. at 195-96, 523 S.E.2d at 60.
65. Id. at 196, 523 S.E.2d at 60.
66. Id. at 198, 523 S.E.2d at 61.
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physical injury.67 Under the "any evidence" standard, the superior
court erred by substituting its own findings for that of the Board. 8
In another "any evidence" case, Bibb County v. Higgins,69 the issue
was whether the employer's expert witness based his testimony upon
misrepresentations of facts posed to him. An employee's former wife, as
next friend of the employee's minor children, brought a claim alleging
the employee's job-related stress and exertion contributed to or
aggravated his hypertension, causing a fatal stroke. v Relying in part
upon the testimony of the employer's expert witness, the ALJ determined that "there was insufficient competent and credible evidence to
prove that [the employee's] stroke arose out of and in the course of his
employment."7 The superior court reversed the Board, finding the
testimony of the expert witness was not supported by facts otherwise
found in the record. The employer appealed the superior court's reversal
of the Board, and the claimant cross appealed, arguing the ALJ also
committed reversible error in basing his award in part upon medical
treatises not admitted into evidence.7 2
The court of appeals found the expert witness' statements were not
based upon misrepresentations, as the superior court had found, because
7 3
there was evidence in the record that supported the expert's opinions.
Thus, the court found that because the evidence was to be construed
most favorably to the Board's award, the superior court was without the
authority to reverse the Board.74 The court also found that although
it is true that "'books of science and art are not admissible in evidence
to prove the opinions of experts,'" 75 this error on the part of the ALJ
"was harmless for want of prejudice inuring to [the employee's]
76
detriment."
Appeal of Interlocutory Orders

B.

In last year's survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed
its previous holdings that there is no appeal to the superior court from

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
241 Ga. App. 161, 526 S.E.2d 379 (1999).
Id. at 161, 526 S.E.2d at 380.
Id.
Id. at 162-63, 526 S.E.2d at 380-81.
Id.
Id. at 163, 526 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. (quoting Suarez v. Suarez, 257 Ga. 102, 103, 355 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1987)).
Id.
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7
an interlocutory order of the State Board of Workers' Compensation.1
This year brings yet another decision on this issue, which not only adds
to the line of cases that interpret the superior court's jurisdiction to hear
appeals under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105 but which also distinguishes a
final decision from a nonfinal decision.
In Cartwright v. Midtown Hospital,8 the employer's expert witness
refused to divulge his social security number to the claimant's counsel
during his deposition. The ALJ denied the claimant's motion to compel
the expert to reveal his social security number. The appellate division
affirmed the AL, as did the superior court, and the claimant then filed
an application for discretionary appeal of that decision.79 The court of
appeals turned to the well-established principle that "only a final award,
order, judgment, or decision of the board is subject to appeal to the
superior court," and held that this was an interlocutory order over which
the superior court had no jurisdiction.8" Cartwright argued that an
order on a change of physician, although not final, could still be
appealed to the superior court."1 The court of appeals distinguished
that case from the instant one. 2 A change of physician, the court
reasoned, is appealable because failure to allow superior court jurisdiction over that kind of order would result in the order's being totally
unreviewable, thereby raising due process concerns.8" Moreover, an
order granting or denying a change of physician is a substantive decision
that affects the injured employee's ability to obtain treatment.
Therefore, public policy demands the appellate review of the order.84
Despite its finding that the superior court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal of the interlocutory order and its vacation of the
judgment, the court of appeals did hold the trial court did not err in its
ruling: "[Any disputes over the relevancy of discoverable information
are within the sound discretion of the trial court." 8

77. H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 51 MERCER L. REV. 549, 560
(1999).
78. 243 Ga. App. 828, 534 S.E.2d 504 (2000).
79. Id. at 828, 534 S.E.2d at 505.
80. Id. at 829-30, 534 S.E.2d at 505-06 (citing Fasher Painting & Decorating Co. v.
Bordelon, 204 Ga. App. 196, 196, 419 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1992)) (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 830, 534 S.E.2d at 506. See Columbus Foundries Inc. v. Moore, 175 Ga. App.
387, 333 S.E.2d 212 (1985).
82. 243 Ga. App. at 830, 534 S.E.2d at 506.
83. Id..
84. Id.
85. Id. (citations omitted).
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C. Average Weekly Wage
The court of appeals addressed two cases dealing with the calculation
of an employee's average weekly wage. The first case involved whether
employer-paid fringe benefits should be included in the calculation of the
wage, and the second case involved an employee who worked for two
different employers at the same time.
In Groover v. Johnson Controls World Service, 6 the Board refused to
include the amount paid by the employer for the employee's health
insurance premiums in the amount of the employee's wage." v The
employee appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed the finding of the
Board."8
The court noted that Board Rule 260(a) 9 contained some direction,
but the Board rule had not been applied as expressly written because it
was inconsistent with prior judicial decisions. 90 Furthermore, the
wording of the Board rule had since changed.91 The court also pointed
out that a Board rule cannot be used to alter judicial interpretation of
a statute, and it found that despite the changes in the Board rule, there
was simply "no legal basis for expanding the statutory term 'average
weekly wage'92 to encompass fringe benefits" such as an employer's
93
direct payment to an insurance provider for employee health benefits.
94
In the second case, O'Kelley v. Hall County Board of Education, the
court addressed a concurrent similar employment situation in which the
employee worked less than thirteen weeks for one of her two employ-

86. 241 Ga. App. 791, 527 S.E.2d 639 (2000).
87. Id. at 792, 527 S.E.2d at 641.
88. Id. at 791, 527 S.E.2d at 640.
89.

GA. BD.OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 260(a) (1999). "[C]omputation of wages

shall include, in addition to salary, hourly pay, or tips, the reasonable value of food,
housing, and other benefits furnished by the employer without charge to the employee
which are listed as earned income on the employee's Federal Form W-2 for federal income
tax purposes." Id.
90. 241 Ga. App. at 793, 527 S.E.2d at 641 (citing Pizza Hut Delivery v. Blackwell, 204
Ga. App. 112, 418 S.E.2d 639 (1992)).
91. Id. Board Rule 260(a) now provides that "[clomputation of wages shall include, in
addition to salary, hourly pay, or tips, the reasonable value of food, housing, and other
benefits furnished by the employer without charge to the employee which constitute a
financial benefit to the employee and are capable of pecuniary calculation." GA. BD.OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 260(a) (2000).

92. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260 (1998 & Supp. 2000).
93. 241 Ga. App. at 793, 527 S.E.2d at 641.
94. 243 Ga. App. 522, 532 S.E.2d 427 (2000).
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ers.95 The employee was hired by the Hall County Board of Education
as a substitute lunchroom worker on September 3, 1995, and she
subsequently became a permanent employee on October 3, 1995. She
was injured on October 18, 1995. She had not worked "substantially the
whole" 96 of the thirteen weeks for the Hall County Board of Education
prior to her injury date, but she had held a part-time job with Dari-Spot
for five years.97
In calculating her average weekly wage, Hall County Board of
Education added her seven weeks of work with Hall County to the
thirteen weeks for Dari-Spot and divided the sum by thirteen. It
contended the language of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-260(1) allowed this
calculation because the statute required only that the employee have
worked in the same kind of job-in this instance, food services-for
thirteen weeks prior to her injury. The employee objected, and the ALJ
agreed with the employee that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-260 did not
encompass the employer's method of calculation. The Board calculated
the wages the employee earned from each job separately and then added
them together. However, the superior court reversed the Board,
agreeing with Hall County's original method of calculation.9"
The court of appeals determined that each employer's wages had to be
calculated separately.99
Section 34-9-260(1) of the O.C.G.A. was
inapplicable to the Hall County Board of Education wage calculation
because the employee had not worked for the Board of Education for
substantially the whole of the thirteen weeks. Thus, the parties had to
look to subsection (2), which the court also found inapplicable because
the parties stipulated there was no similarly situated employee.' 00

95. Id. at 523, 532 S.E.2d at 428. When an employee is concurrently employed by
different employers at the time of the injury, is doing similar work for each of them, and
sustains an injury while working for one of the employers who is subject to the Workers'
Compensation Act, the employee's total wages from all his employers are considered in
determining the average weekly wage. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Idov, 88 Ga.
App. 697, 700, 77 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1953).
96. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-260(1) (1998 & Supp. 2000) states:
If the injured employee shall have worked in the employment in which he was
working at the time of the injury, whether for the same or another employer,
during substantially the whole of 13 weeks immediately preceding the injury, his
average weekly wage shall be one-thirteenth of the total amount of wages earned
in such employment during the 13 weeks.
97. 243 Ga. App. at 522, 532 S.E.2d at 428.
98. Id. at 522-23, 532 S.E.2d at 428.
99. Id. at 524, 532 S.E.2d at 429.
100. Id. at 524-25, 532 S.E.2d at 429. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-260(2) (1998 & Supp. 2000)
states:
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"Where neither subsection (1) nor subsection (2) can 'reasonably and
fairly be applied,' subsection (3) states that 'the full-time weekly wage
of the injured employee [must] be used."""' Thus, the Hall County
wages should have been calculated as the wage per hour multiplied by
the number of hours that would constitute a full-time work week for that
employee. 102
The court of appeals held that the Board properly
calculated the employee's wage and reversed the superior court.0 3
D. Burden of Proof
Faced with a difficult set of facts, the court of appeals took the
opportunity in Hulbert v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,1"4 to discuss a claimant's burden of proof to establish a compensable workers' compensation
injury.0 5 Hulbert, a Domino's Pizza delivery man, testified he was
returning from a pizza delivery when he was pulled over by a vehicle
with a flashing blue light. Hulbert was approached by someone he
assumed to be a police officer but whom he could not identify because
the individual shined a bright light in his face. After the individual
allegedly said, "Take this," Hulbert was doused with gasoline and set on
fire, suffering second- and third-degree burns to fifty percent of his body,
requiring months of hospitalization.' 6
Domino's controverted its liability, contending the assault was not
related to Hulbert's employment as a pizza deliverer. Specifically,
Domino's presented evidence attempting to show either that the assault
was an act of revenge perpetrated by Hulbert's brother-in-law because
Hulbert had committed sexual battery against the brother-in-law's child
five years earlier, or that Hulbert injured himself. The ALJ, the
appellate division of the Board, and the superior court agreed that
Hulbert failed to demonstrate the assault was causally related to his

If the injured employee shall not have worked in such employment during
substantially the whole of 13 weeks immediately preceding the injury, the wages
of a similar employee in the same employment who has worked substantially the
whole of such 13 weeks shall be used in making the determination under the
preceding paragraph.
101. Id. at 525, 532 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260(3)); see also Federated
Mut. Hardware Ins. Co. v. Elliott, 88 Ga. App. 266, 271, 76 S.E.2d 568, 571 (1953) (stating
that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-260(3) must be applied when subsections (1) and (2) are
inapplicable in arriving at the average weekly wage).
102. 243 Ga. App. at 525, 532 S.E.2d at 430 (citing Black v. American & Foreign Ins.
Co., 123 Ga. App. 133, 136, 179 S.E.2d 679, 682 (1970)).
103. Id.
104. 239 Ga. App. 370, 521 S.E.2d 43 (1999).
105. Id. at 372, 521 S.E.2d at 46.
106. Id. at 370-71, 521 S.E.2d at 45.
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employment. °7 However, the court of appeals reversed, finding the
ALJ placed a greater burden of proof on the claimant than the Act
requires.1 08
Writing for a three-judge panel, Judge Barnes concluded that
"Hulbert's uncontradicted testimony that he was returning to Domino's
after having delivered a pizza when he was the victim of an unprovoked
attack by an unidentified person for unknown reasons was sufficient to
meet [his] burden."0 9 The court went on to hold Domino's various
theories as to what caused Hulbert's assault "are really affirmative
defenses and not part of a claimant's initial burden.""0
Noting that pizza deliverers are "exposed to dangers through the
nature of their employment," the court concluded that "the conditions of
Hulbert's employment did not merely provide the time and place for the
assault, but increased the risk of attack, and subjected him to a danger
peculiar to his employment."'
However, Domino's presented evidence
from the investigating police officer that more than $500 cash was found
in the Domino's truck; that robbery did not appear to have been a motive
in the assault; and that although Hulbert's eyeglasses, cigarette lighter,
and driver's license were found at the scene, no tire tracks or other
evidence demonstrated that another vehicle was present when Hulbert
was burned." 2 The court seems to have concluded that random
assault is a particular risk of pizza deliverers, apparently relying upon
evidence submitted by Hulbert that rocks had been thrown at Domino's
employees in the area where Hulbert worked, and that Domino's delivery
persons in general have been the target of violent assaults in other areas
of the country."3
Therefore, although the attacker was unidentified and the reason for
the assault was completely unexplained, the court of appeals concluded
that Hulbert had sufficiently met his initial burden of proof to recover
workers' compensation benefits." 4
To hold otherwise, the court
believed, would place an impossible burden on the claimant "to prove
that he never did anything to make anyone mad at him at any time
before the attack."'15 The burden of proof in this case, therefore, fell
to the employer to prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" its

107.
i08.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 371-72, 521 S.E.2d at 45-46.
at 370, 521 S.E.2d at 45.
at 372, 521 S.E.2d at 46.
at 373, 521 S.E.2d at 46-47.
at 371, 521 S.E.2d 45-46.
at 372-73, 521 S.E.2d at 46.
at 374, 521 S.E.2d at 47.
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affirmative defenses that Hulbert's injuries were either self-inflicted or
the result of a personal attack unrelated to his employment.'16 The
court went on to note that the evidence presented by Domino's amounted
to "mere speculation and conjecture in the form of possible inconsistent
theories for possible causes of Hulbert's injuries."117 It is difficult to
imagine, however, what other evidence Domino's might have presented
with regard to its affirmative defenses, and indeed, the burden of proof
suggested by the court of appeals with regard to this affirmative defense
might be as impossible as the burden the court found unreasonable to
apply to the claimant.
E. Change in Condition
This year's survey period brought two changes-in-condition cases. The
first, Georgia-PacificCorp. v. Wilson,"8 deals as much with the "any
evidence" standard of review as it does with change in condition. The
employee, Wilson, suffered from compensable carpal tunnel syndrome,
with an onset in February or March 1994. From March through October
1994, she continued to work in an unrelated part-time job with another
employer, cleaning offices five nights a week for four hours a night.
Following a hearing, the ALJ awarded Wilson medical expenses and
directed Georgia-Pacific to pay her weekly benefits for the time she
underwent carpal tunnel release surgery. However, the ALJ found that
any continuing wrist problems from which Wilson suffered were not
related to her compensable injury."9
A year and a half later the employee was back before the Board
requesting a change in condition for the worse as of March 6, 1997 and
continuing. She had, by that time, developed reflex sympathetic
dystrophy ("RSD"), which precluded her from working, and she was also
suffering from depression, which she contended was the result of, or was
at least exacerbated by, her original wrist injury. In his award, the ALJ
found no medical evidence conclusively linking the compensable injury
and the RSD and found Wilson had, in fact, fully recovered from her
injury by June 1995.12° He also found the employee's depression was
not related to the original wrist injury, but to other nonwork-related
problems that affected the employee's hands and wrists.' 2 ' The
appellate division determined the ALJ's findings in this regard were

116. Id.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
240 Ga. App. 123, 522 S.E.2d 700 (1999).
Id. at 123, 522 S.E.2d at 702.
Id.
Id.
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supported by a preponderance of the credible and competent evidence
and affirmed.' 22
Wilson took her case to the superior court, which found insufficient
evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the disabling mental
condition was not precipitated by her compensable wrist injury. 2 ' The
superior court found evidence in the record that showed "her disabling
emotional condition was caused by an unbroken series of medical
problems with her hands and wrists, the first of which was work related
and compensable."' 24
The superior court, therefore, reversed the
Board. 2 '
The court of appeals agreed with Georgia-Pacific's argument that the
superior court had overstepped the legal scope of its review. 126 The
court cited the age-old propositions that findings of fact made by the
Board are conclusive and binding if there is any evidence to support
them and that the issue of whether an employee's alleged inability to
work is due to a change in condition is a question of fact for the
27
ALJ.'
The court went on to state that Wilson, as the party seeking
a change in condition determination, bore the burden of proving her
disability was proximately caused by her previous compensable injury
because a psychological injury is compensable only if it is found to arise
naturally and unavoidably from some discernible physical occurrence. 12 Citing to the record and facts as found below, the court of
appeals noted that Wilson had been diagnosed with long-standing
emotional conflicts, panic attacks, and phobia even before her original
on-the-job injury.'2 9 This evidence supported the Board's determination that Wilson had failed to carry her burden of proof on the change
in condition, and the superior court's decision was reversed. 3 °
The second change-in-condition case this year, Aldrich v. City of
Lumber City,'3 ' picks up where Bahadori v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co.132 left off last year. In Bahadori the supreme court held

122. Id. at 124, 522 S.E.2d at 702.
123. Id.
124. Id., 522 S.E.2d at 702-03.
125. Id., 522 S.E.2d at 702.
126. Id. at 126, 522 S.E.2d at 704.
127. Id. at 124-25, 522 S.E.2d at 703.
128. Id. at 125, 522 S.E.2d at 703. See Southwire v. George, 266 Ga. 739, 741, 470
S.E.2d 865, 866 (1996).
129. 240 Ga. App. at 126, 522 S.E.2d at 703-04.
130. Id., 522 S.E.2d at 704.
131. 241 Ga. App. 724, 530 S.E.2d 195 (1999).
132. 270 Ga. 203, 507 S.E.2d 467 (1998); see also H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers'
Compensation, 51 MERCER L. REV. 549, 570 (1999) (explaining O.C.G.A. section 34-9-
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that a two-year statute of limitations applied to claims by an employer/insurer for reimbursement of an overpayment of benefits to an
employee who had returned to work.133 In Aldrich the court of appeals
was asked to decide whether a change in condition could be found to
have occurred and whether reimbursement by the employee could be
ordered retroactively to a prior decision of the Board.'
The facts of this case were somewhat similar to those in Bahadori.
Aldrich was injured in 1989 when his foot was struck by lightning while
working as a police officer for the City of Lumber City. After an
evidentiary hearing and an appeal to the appellate division, his claim
was found to be compensable in an order of the Board dated May 3,
1991. While the appeal had been pending, the employee secretly
returned to work, first for the Department of Family and Children's
Services ("DFACS"), and then as a security guard. In 1994 he began
working as a police officer for the City of Alamo. Although he was
working this entire time, Aldrich continued to receive total disability
benefits pursuant to the Board's May 1991 award. On November 3,
1994, Aldrich's patrol car allegedly hit a cow, and he filed a workers'
compensation claim for neck and knee injuries allegedly arising out of
that incident. The adjuster, thinking she recognized Aldrich's name
from the 1989 claim, investigated and determined the two claims were
filed by the very same person. She therefore controverted the 1994
injury and terminated his temporary total disability
("TTD") payments
5
for the 1989 injury effective December 7, 1994."1
The employee requested a hearing, seeking reinstatement of benefits
136
for the 1989 injury based upon a change in condition for the worse.
The ALJ was unimpressed by Aldrich and his testimony and not only
found that he failed to prove a change in condition for the worse as of
December 1994, but also that the evidence showed Aldrich had changed
for the better as of February 7, 1991. Therefore, the ALJ ordered the
employee to reimburse the employer/insurer for all weekly benefits paid
from February 7, 1991 through December 7, 1994. The appellate
division and the superior court affirmed this decision.3
Aldrich argued to the court of appeals that the finding of a change in
condition as of February 1991 was a violation of res judicata because the

104(d)(2) was intended to limit claims for overpayment to change in condition cases only).
133. 270 Ga. at 203, 507 S.E.2d at 469.
134. 241 Ga. App. at 727, 530 S.E.2d at 197-98.
135. Id. at 724-25, 530 S.E.2d at 196.
136. He also, in the alternative, claimed that he suffered a new on-the-job injury in
1994. This assertion was, however, rejected by the A.J. Id. at 725, 530 S.E,2d at 196.
137. Id.
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Board's May 3, 1991 award had granted him benefits. 13 The court
disagreed. 139 First, it cited to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(b), which
allows for modification of a Board award under certain statutory
circumstances. 40 Finding that all the criteria of Section 34-9-104(b)
were met in this case-there was a change in condition ending the
employee's entitlement to benefits; the prior decision had not been based
upon a settlement; and the two-year statute of limitations had not
run-the court held the Board had jurisdiction to modify its May 3, 1991
award. 4 1 Second, the court held the Board had not erred in finding
the change in condition to be retroactive to February 1991 because
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(d) expressly allows for these retroactive
findings. 142 Specifically, "[tihe award or other order contained in the
final decision entered by the administrative law judge or the board shall
be effective as of the time of change in condition as found by the
or board, notwithstandingthe retroactiveeffect
administrative law judge
4
of the award or order." 1
Finally, the court cited to Bahadori for the proposition that an
employer/insurer is not limited to recovering only those overpayments
made after last established by award and held that, if the statute of
limitations were not a problem, or if its expiration could be overcome by
proving fraud on the part of the employee so as to toll the statute, then
all overpayments could be recovered.'"
One interesting footnote to this case is that the above decision by the
court of appeals was not its initial decision. The original decision,
authored by Judge Smith, was actually vacated after a motion for
reconsideration was filed by the employer/insurer, based in large part

138. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 196-97. Another argument advanced by Aldrich was that
certain stipulations and agreements set forth in a reimbursement agreement entered into
between the employer/insurer and the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund ("SITF") barred
review of the May 1991 award. The court found they did not for three reasons: (1) The
award predated the SITF agreement by several years, and it therefore could not be based
on the SITF agreement, in whole or in part; (2) the reimbursement agreement was a plan
for repayment by the SITF to the employer/insurer, and not a settlement agreement
between the employee and the employer/insurer, which is specifically prohibited from
subsequent review under the terms of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(b); and (3) because the
employee was not a party to the reimbursement agreement, and because the issues in the
agreement and the board award were not identical, res iudicata did not apply to the award.
Id. at 727-28, 530 S.E.2d at 198.
139. Id. at 725, 530 S.E.2d at 197.
140. Id. at 726, 530 S.E.2d at 197.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 727, 530 S.E.2d at 197.
143. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(d)(2) (1998)) (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 727-28, 530 S.E.2d at 197-98.
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upon the supreme court's ruling in Bahadori. The above opinion,
authored by Judge Eldridge and concurred in by Chief Judge Johnson,
Presiding Judge Pope, and Judge Ellington, was substituted in its place,
14
and Judge Smith's original majority opinion became the dissent. 1
Judge Blackburn concurred specially in-part and dissented in part.'4 6
Thus, a very divided court of appeals essentially reversed itself. The
matter is now pending before the Georgia Supreme Court, and next
year's issue of the survey will report on the final outcome of this
interesting saga.
Conduct in a Workers' Compensation Case
A recent opinion that was not issued in a workers' compensation case,
but which is nevertheless indirectly relevant to the compensation arena,
was In re D.KM. 4 Plaintiff, an aspiring lawyer, filed an application
for certification of fitness to practice law in 1992. For the next several
years, he sat for the bar exam, but he did not pass it. His certification
to practice law was suspended in 1996, after the Board to Determine
Fitness of Bar Applicants ("the Fitness Board") received a complaint
from an ALJ of the State Board of Workers' Compensation, who had
presided over plaintiff's pro se workers' compensation case.' 48
A formal hearing was held before the Fitness Board. The hearing
officer found D.K.M.'s conduct in the workers' compensation case was
49
"inappropriate, threatening, and an abuse of the legal process."
Furthermore, D.K.M. had shown a total lack of judgment and common
courtesy. The officer found he had filed complaints against the ALJ and
opposing counsel that were frivolous and lacking in justification or
integrity. Upon reviewing the officer's findings, the Fitness Board tabled
D.K.M.'s application, recommending he engage in community service
F

145. Id. at 733, 530 S.E.2d at 201 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith was joined by
Judge Barnes in his dissent. Judge Smith focused on the part of O.C.G.A. section 34-9104(d)(1), which states that the retroactive effect of a change-in-condition decision is

"subject to the limitation in subsection (a) of this Code section," including the requirement

that the change occurred after the date on which the employee's wage-earning status was
last established. Id. Judge Smith reasoned that Bahadorihad no application to Aldrich's
case, as the former case did not even address the retroactivity of a change-in-condition
award. Id. at 733-34, 530 S.E.2d at 202. Instead of applying the change-in-condition
analysis used by the majority, Judge Smith would have applied a fraud-based analysis and

a totally different legal remedy: a motion in the superior court to set aside the May 1991
award, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-60(d). Id. at 734-35, 530 S.E.2d at 203.
146. 241 Ga. App. at 728,530 S.E.2d at 198 (Blackburn, J., concurring specially in part,
dissenting in part).

147. 271 Ga. 473, 520 S.E.2d 216 (1999).
148. Id. at 473, 520 S.E.2d at 217.
149. Id.

2000]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

525

activities that would demonstrate his rehabilitation, good character, and
fitness to practice law. Instead, plaintiff wrote a letter to the Fitness
Board stating that he could not engage in those sorts of activities due to
his workers' compensation back injury, but that he had donated money
to the homeless and hired poor persons to perform yard work for him.
Unimpressed, the Board denied his application for certification of fitness
to practice law. D.K.M. appealed to the supreme court. 5 °
Applying the "any evidence" standard of review, the supreme court
held the record indeed supported the Board's decision to deny certification to D.K.M.' 5' In particular, plaintiff's conduct before the ALJ in
his workers' compensation case was persuasive to the court. Although
he had written letters of apology to the ALJ and opposing counsel in
that case, D.K.M. had never recognized the inappropriateness of his
behavior, and he had never explained or taken responsibility for his
actions. Moreover, he had not been forthright in his responses to the
Fitness Board, which was a basis for finding him unfit to practice law.
Finally, D.K.M. had failed to prove his rehabilitation by clear and
convincing evidence simply by donating money and food to the poor.'52
The message of In re D.KM. might be for pro se claimants in workers'
compensation cases to be on their best and most professional behavior,
lest they one day decide they want to be certified as fit to practice law.
The same rule, however, certainly applies to those who are already
admitted to practice law in Georgia.
G.

Credit for Workers' Compensation Payments

In Georgia Forestry Commission v. Taylor,'53 the court of appeals
held as a matter of first impression that an employer's credit under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-24311 for disability benefits paid to an employee
under the employer's plan was to be calculated based on the net, rather

150. Id. at 473-74, 520 S.E.2d at 217.
151. Id. at 474, 520 S.E.2d at 217.
152. Id.
153. 241 Ga. App. 151, 526 S.E.2d 373 (1999).
154. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-243(b) (1998) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this Code section or in a collective bargaining
agreement, the employer's obligation to pay or cause to be paid weekly benefits
under Code Section 34-9-261 or 34-9-262 shall be reduced by the employer funded
portion of payments received or being received by the employee pursuant to a
disability plan, a wage continuation plan, or from a disability insurance policy
established or maintained by the same employer from whom benefits under Code
Section 34-9-261 or 34-9-262 are claimed if the employer did contribute to such a
plan or policy. The employer funded portion shall be based upon the ratio of the
employer's contributions to the total contributions to such plan or policy.
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than the gross, amount of benefits. 5' The employee's gross disability
retirement benefits amounted to $1,622.02 per month, but after state
and federal taxes and health insurance premiums were deducted, he
received a monthly net amount of $1,268.52. The ALJ, appellate
division, and superior court all determined that the employer's credit
under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-243 would be based on the5 net benefit
I
appealed.'
rather than the gross benefit, and the employer
Despite noting that the amount the employee received could actually
have been manipulated by the employee to "maximize his recovery," the
court of appeals affirmed the court below, finding rules of statutory
construction would require a review of the plain language of O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-243(c) 57 and finding:
the amount for which the employer receives credit is the amount to
which the employee is entitled-which is that amount which the
employee has received or is receiving. Because the statute does not
state that the employer should be credited for the amounts paid, the
employer's credit should be based on the amounts the employee
actually receives, i.e., the net amount of the check.' 58
H.

Employer/Employee Relationship

Though also not a workers' compensation case, Kilburn v. Patrick 59
illustrates how workers' compensation analysis and principles are
applied even outside the scope of the Act. This case involved a
shareholder action against a corporation for conversion and breach of
fiduciary duty.160 The shareholder agreement entered into by plaintiff
contained a provision stating that if a shareholder "withdraws, resigns,
or is terminated with or without cause by the Board of Directors from
his employment by the Corporation," then the other majority or minority
shareholder, as the case might be, was granted the option and right to
purchase all of the transferring stockholder's shares.16 '
Plaintiff,
Patrick, resigned from the company and sought to prevent the other
shareholder from purchasing his shares. In support of his position,

155. 241 Ga. App. at 151, 526 S.E.2d at 373.
156. Id. at 152, 526 S.E.2d at 373-74.
157. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-243(c) (1998). "The credit or reduction of benefits provided in
subsection (b) of this Code section shall only be made for those amounts which the
employee is entitled to, has received, or is receiving during any period in which benefits
under Code Section 34-9-261 or 34-9-262 are claimed." Id.
158. 241 Ga. App. at 153, 526 S.E.2d at 374.
159. 241 Ga. App. 214, 525 S.E.2d 108 (1999).
160. Id. at 214, 525 S.E.2d at 109.
161. Id. at 214-15, 525 S.E.2d at 109.
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Patrick asserted that the stock repurchase provision in the shareholder
agreement applied only to employees of the company who resigned,
withdrew, or were terminated. Because he was not an employee but,
rather, a shareholder, his shares could not be purchased. The trial court
agreed, finding the term "employment" in the purchase provisions
unambiguously indicated a master-servant relationship. It therefore
directed a verdict for plaintiff on the conversion claim.162
The court of appeals held that the directed verdict was error and that
the trial court had wrongly, and narrowly, interpreted the term
"employment" as used in the shareholder agreement.163 The court
pointed out that Georgia law often gives "employment" a broader
meaning than simply the master-servant relationship."
By way of
example, it cited to the workers' compensation context in which an
employer/employee relationship can be inferred when one party "receives
valuable services from another[] and retains the right to control and
discharge the one performing the services." 6 '
Because the term
"employment" was capable of more than one interpretation, the court
looked to find a construction that would uphold the contract in whole
and in every part. 16 The court concluded that interpreting "employee"
as including only a traditional, typical, master-servant relationship
would render the shareholder agreement meaningless.'6 7 None of the
minority or majority shareholders would be deemed to be an employee
of the company under this strict analysis, and therefore, no repurchase
provision could even come into effect.'68
By looking to workers'
compensation law principles and definitions, the court was able to bring
a clear and accurate reading to an agreement at issue in a case not
involving workers' compensation.
I.

Failureto Obtain Workers' Compensation Coverage

The court of appeals heard three cases during the survey period
dealing with an employer's failure to obtain workers' compensation
insurance. While one case dealt with an employer's liability for failing
to obtain insurance, the other two dealt with an employer's remedy
against those who failed to procure coverage on the employer's behalf.

162. Id. at 215, 525 S.E.2d at 110.
163. Id. at 216, 525 S.E.2d at 110.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Housing Auth., City of Cartersville v. Jackson, 226 Ga. App. 182, 184,
486 S.E.2d 54, 56 (1997)).
166. Id. at 217, 525 S.E.2d at 111.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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In Sheehan v. Delaney,'69 the claimant was injured while working for
American Trucking, which had no workers' compensation insurance in
violation of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2(a). v° After an ALJ awarded the
claimant benefits, American Trucking commenced bankruptcy proceedings, having not paid any of the claimant's workers' compensation
benefits. The claimant then filed a complaint in superior court against
the sole shareholders of American Trucking, seeking a monetary
judgment for the benefits payable under the ALJ award.' 7 '
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the claimant, affirming a long-standing principle that if an
employer becomes insolvent, the agent of the employer responsible for
procuring workers' compensation benefits may be held personally
liable. 7 2 The court also rejected defendant's argument that the
claimant was required to show negligence in defendant's failure to obtain
workers' compensation insurance for the trucking company. 73 The
court found no precedent for the proposition that the owners of a
business are only liable if they are negligent in failing to procure
workers' compensation coverage, and the court also concluded that no
such requirement is appropriate given the "quid pro quo" toward
immunity
that an employer holds under the workers' compensation
74
system. 1

In National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. v. Strickland, 75 the employer was plaintiff in an action brought in state court
seeking damages for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty to provide
workers' compensation coverage. Plaintiff, Strickland, sought workers'
compensation coverage for himself and his company, All Star Concrete,
from the Matrix Insurance Agency. Plaintiff was told by the agency that
his premium would be higher for his inclusion in All Star Concrete's
coverage, and Strickland completed an application for workers'
compensation coverage to this effect. After several insurers refused to
write coverage for plaintiff, the agency applied to the National Council
on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") for coverage through the Assigned
Risk Pool. NCCI operates under a contract with the Georgia Insurance
Commissioner to serve as administrator for the Assigned Risk Pool, and

169. 238 Ga. App. 662, 521 S.E.2d 585 (1999).
170. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a) (1998).
171. 238 Ga. App. at 662, 521 S.E.2d at 586.
172. Id. (citing Samuel v. Baitcher, 247 Ga. 71, 73-74, 274 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1981);
Underwood v. Dunn, 221 Ga. App. 185, 186, 470 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1996)).
173. Id. at 663, 521 S.E.2d at 586.
174. Id. at 664, 521 S.E.2d at 587.
175. 241 Ga. App. 504, 526 S.E.2d 924 (1999).
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it has authority to bind insurance coverage for those insurers within the
Pool. In reviewing plaintiff's application, however, an account analyst
for NCCI found insufficient payroll to include plaintiff individually
within All Star Concrete's coverage. The NCCI analyst allegedly
contacted the insurance agent and was told simply to remove plaintiff
from coverage, and the analyst complied. The insurance agency,
however, denied ever giving this instruction. Plaintiff was never advised
that his
individual request for coverage was removed from the applica176
tion.

Plaintiff sued NCCI and the insurance agency when he was later
injured on the job and was denied coverage. 177 The court of appeals
reversed a grant of summary judgment to NCCI,finding that it acted as
a "gratuitous volunteer" and that a jury question remained as to whether
its actions caused the lack of coverage and whether plaintiff's failure to
read the policy that was ultimately issued constituted contributory
negligence. 171 "In changing and altering the application, instead of
rejecting it and requiring a written authorization for the declination of
individual coverage by the plaintiff or a supplemental application form,
NCCI exceeded its authority as administrator and gratuitously assumed
new duties as a volunteer with different non-contractual duties." 79
The case was therefore remanded to allow plaintiff to proceed with his
claim against NCCI and the insurance agency although the court noted
plaintiff's failure to read the policy that was ultimately issued may affect
plaintiff's ability to recover. 80
The employer was also successful in GFA Business Solutions, Inc. v.
Greenway Insurance Agency, Inc.,181 which involved a suit for damages
against an insurance agency for failure to procure workers' compensation
insurance after the employer provided more than $229,000 in premiums
over a two-year period of time. Plaintiff, GFA Business Solution
("GFA"), agreed with O'Malley of the Greenway Insurance Agency
("Greenway") for the agency to provide workers' compensation insurance.
O'Malley was given a check for $7,000 as a down payment on initial
premium, and GFA paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in premiums
over the next two years. O'Malley issued a certificate of insurance
confirming GFA's coverage. An insurance investigator, however, later
informed GFA that O'Malley had never obtained insurance on its behalf.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 505-06, 526 S.E.2d at 926.
Id. at 505, 526 S.E.2d at 926.
Id. at 507-08, 526 S.E.2d at 927-28.
Id. at 507, 526 S.E.2d at 927.
Id. at 508, 526 S.E.2d at 928.
243 Ga. App. 35, 531 S.E.2d 134 (2000).

530

MERCER LAW REVIEW

.[Vol. 52

Instead, O'Malley had paid claims out of Greenway Agency accounts,
and the GFA premiums had been used either for paying claims or for
O'Malley's personal use."8 2
GFA sued Greenway for breach of contract and fraud, but the agency
was granted summary judgment by the trial court, which found that no
"insurance contract" existed between the agency and GFA and that
Greenway could not be held liable for fraud by the unauthorized acts of
O'Malley. 83 While the court of appeals agreed that Greenway was not
liable for fraud, it reversed the trial court's finding that GFA could not
recover for breach of contract.'
The court noted that the contract
between GFA and Greenway was not an "insurance contract," but rather
was an agreement for Greenway to procure insurance for GFA."8' The
court found O'Malley had actual authority to bind Greenway to procure
insurance, and the evidence demonstrated an oral agreement to this
effect. 8 The case was therefore reversed and remanded to allow GFA
to proceed against Greenway for breach of contract. 87
J.

Independent Contractor/Statutory Employer

The case of Greg Fisher,Ltd. v. Samples 1 8 presented an interesting
review of the various potential theories of recovery for a subcontractor
who is injured when in the performance of work for a general contractor.
Unfortunately for the claimant, Mr. Samples, none of the available
theories afforded him any coverage for his injuries.' 89
Samples, who owned a carpentry business and worked side by side
with his employees, was hired by Fisher to perform framing work on a
building project. Although Samples obtained workers' compensation
insurance for his employees, he elected to exempt himself from coverage
as permitted by O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2.2.190 After sustaining an
injury, Samples pursued workers' compensation coverage from his own
insurer and from Fisher. After being informed by his own carrier that
coverage was denied because he had exempted himself from coverage,
Samples pursued his claim against Fisher on the grounds that Fisher
was his statutory employer pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-8(a),' 9'

182. Id. at 35-36, 531 S.E.2d at 135.
183. Id. at 36, 531 S.E.2d at 135.
184. Id., 531 S.E.2d at 136.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 36-37, 531 S.E.2d at 136.
187. Id. at 36, 531 S.E.2d at 136.
188. 238 Ga. App. 825, 520 S.E.2d 280 (1999).
189. Id. at 828-29, 520 S.E.2d at 282-83.
190. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.2 (1998 & Supp. 2000).
191. Id. § 34-9-8(a) (1998).
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and alternatively that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-124(b) 92 estopped Fisher
from denying
coverage. 9 3 The court of appeals rejected both of these
94
arguments.
The court first noted that Samples was barred from pursuing coverage
against-his own insurer because of his election not to be included as an
employee under that policy. 9 ' Samples' election in this regard also
proved fatal to his claim under O.C*G.A. section 34-9-8(a) that Fisher
was his statutory employer. This code section provides that "a principal,
intermediate, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any
employee injured while in the employ of any of his subcontractors." 96
As the court pointed out, Samples was clearly not an "employee" of
Fisher's subcontractor, but to the contrary, Samples was the subcontractor.'97 Therefore, he was not entitled to the coverage afforded to
employees of subcontractors under the statutory employer provisions. 9 '
The court similarly rejected Samples' arguments that Fisher was
estopped to deny coverage under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-124(b), which
refers to coverage being extended to "employees ordinarily exempt from
its provisions." As the court pointed out, Samples' status was that of an
owner and .employer, not an employee.' 99 Moreover, the court noted
that the cases relied upon by Samples were all decided prior to the
enactment of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2.2 in 1984, and the court therefore
did not contemplate Samples' situation as an owner/employer who
exempted himself from coverage.0 0
K

Jurisdictionon Appeal

If a superior court does not enter its award within twenty days of a
hearing on an appeal, it loses jurisdiction, 2 1 even if the order entered
after the twenty-day deadline concerns only attorney fees under O.C.G.A.
section. 9-15-14(b). °2 In Brassfield & Gorrie v. Ogletree,2 ° ' the ALJ
and appellate division determined an employer was responsible for an

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. § 34-9-124(b).
238 Ga. App. at 825-26, 520 S.E.2d at 281.
Id. at 827-28, 520 S.E.2d at 282-83.
Id. at 828, 520 S.E.2d at 282.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a) (emphasis added).
238 Ga. App. at 827-28, 520 S.E.2d at 282.
Id. at 827, 520 S.E.2d at 282.
Id. at 828, 520 S.E.2d at 283.
Id.
Taylor Timber Co. v. Baker, 226 Ga. App. 211, 212-13, 485 S.E.2d 819, 821 (1997).
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (1993 & Supp. 2000).
241 Ga. App. 56, 526 S.E.2d 103 (1999).
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employee's proposed surgery.204 The employer appealed to superior
court, and the employee filed a motion for attorney fees based on
frivolous appeal. After a hearing on the matter, but more than twenty
days later, the superior court entered an order awarding the employee
attorney fees.20 5 The court of appeals determined the narrow twentyday window, designed to promote speedy resolution of workers'
compensation appeals, applies to all aspects of the case. 2 6 The court
of appeals reversed the superior court's ruling, finding the superior court
lost jurisdiction of the case when an order on the attorney fees had not
20 7
been entered within twenty days of the hearing.
L.

Petition for Entry of Judgment

Under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-106,20s the superior court has the power
to render judgment on an award of the State Board of Workers'
Compensation. The power of the court is very narrow, allowing the court
simply to render judgment on the award and notify the parties unless
the award on its face is legally insufficient.2 9 In Hansche v. City of
21°
Atlanta Police Department,
an employee requested the superior court
enter judgment on an award against the city. The city objected and
argued it was entitled to credit for temporary partial disability benefits
paid to the employee even though the Board's award stated the city was
not entitled to such a credit. The superior court, however, denied the
employee's petition on the ground that the Board's award was unclear.2 11
The court of appeals found the superior court should have granted the
employee's petition because the Board's award was legally sufficient in
stating the city could not take a credit for the temporary partial
disability benefits already paid.21 2 The court pointed out that the city
should have appealed the original award rather than attempt to obtain

204. Id. at 56, 526 S.E.2d at 104.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 57, 526 S.E.2d at 104 (citing Felton Pearson Co. v. Nelson, 260 Ga. 513, 514,
397 S.E.2d 431, 432 (1990)).

207. Id.
208. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106 (1998).
209. Id. Hansche v. City of Atlanta Police Dep't, 242 Ga. App. 606, 608, 530 S.E.2d
512, 513 (2000); see also Wade v. Harris, 210 Ga. App. 882,885,437 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1993);
City of Hapeville v. Preston, 67 Ga. App. 350, 357, 20 S.E.2d 202, 207 (1942) (stating the
superior court is to enforce, not change, the award).
210. 242 Ga. App. at 606, 530 S.E.2d at 512.
211. Id. at 607, 530 S.E.2d at 512-13.
212. Id. at 608, 530 S.E.2d at 513.
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the credit when the employee petitioned for entry of judgment. 213 By
failing to appeal the original award to the superior court, the city waived
any new arguments it had. Thus, the superior court should have
entered judgment as demanded in the employee's petition.214
M.

Premium Disputes

A workers' compensation insurer that sued for collection of unpaid
premiums got more than it bargained for in the case of International
Indemnity Co. v. Regional Employer Service, Inc.215 The employer,
Regional Employer, counterclaimed against the insurer, alleging it paid
excessive premiums due to the insurer's submission of incorrect data to
a licensed rating organization. A jury found in favor of the employer,
awarding special damages of $109,000 and attorney fees of $23,006
against the insurer.216
The court of appeals affirmed, but it avoided the question of whether
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-136,217 which requires a workers' compensation
insurer to submit statistical data to an employer before it goes to a
licensed rating organization for determining an employer's experience
modification factor, creates a private cause of action for a violation of
this statute.2 18 In ruling upon the insurer's allegation that the trial
court committed error by allowing evidence that this statute was
violated, the court simply noted that the evidence was probative with
respect to the insurer's claims for unpaid premiums because it might be
considered by the jury with respect to mitigation of damages and setoff.219 The court also held that sufficient evidence of causation was
presented by evidence that the insurer reported inaccurate data to the
rating organization, resulting in excessive premiums, and by evidence
from the insurer's own vice president, who acknowledged that inaccurate
data supplied to the rating organization would result in inaccurate
premiums.22 °

213.
214.

Id.
Id.

215. 239 Ga. App. 420, 520 S.E.2d 533 (1999).
216. Id. at 420, 520 S.E.2d at 534-35.
217.
218.
219.
220.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-136 (1998).
239 Ga. App. at 421, 520 S.E.2d at 535.
Id.
Id. at 423, 520 S.E.2d at 537.
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PriorInconsistent Testimony

A third nonworkers' compensation case, Smalls v. Walker,221 involved an injured employee taking conflicting positions in a workers'
compensation claim and in his subsequent personal injury claim. Smalls
was employed as a route salesman and suffered a compensable neck
injury in an accident that occurred in January 1995. He received TTD
benefits and was then released to work without limitations. On May 13,
1995, Smalls was involved in a nonwork-related accident when
defendants, Walker and Boyd, backed into his vehicle.222 Attempting
to obtain additional workers' compensation benefits for his original onthe-job injury, Smalls denied that the May 1995 accident caused any
injury to him or to his vehicle, testifying he had been experiencing
disabling pain ever since January 1995. The ALJ disagreed with Smalls'
contentions, finding the medical evidence showed a more significant
accident than the employee had claimed, one that was sufficient to
aggravate his pre-existing neck problems so as to cause additional pain
and disability. The claim for workers' compensation benefits was
therefore denied.22 3
Smalls was forced to file for bankruptcy in 1996 during the pendency
of his workers' compensation appeals. In his bankruptcy petition, he did
not list any personal injury claim against defendants as a potential
asset. However, he brought this personal injury action against Walker
and Boyd in 1997.224 The trial court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment in large part based upon Smalls' testimony in his
workers' compensation claim that he was not injured in the May 1995
accident.225 On appeal the court held that Smalls was not judicially
estopped from asserting his personal injury action by virtue of his prior
inconsistent testimony in the workers' compensation case that he had

221. 243 Ga. App. 453, 532 S.E.2d 420 (2000).
222. Id. at 453-54, 532 S.E.2d at 421.
223. Id. at 454, 532 S.E.2d at 421.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 454-55, 532 S.E.2d at 422. The trial court also ruled against Smalls on the
grounds that he had not listed the claim against Walker and Boyd as an asset in his
bankruptcy petition. Id. at 456, 532 S.E.2d at 422. The court of appeals did find, in
accordance with existing legal precedent, that this omission resulted in Smalls' being
judicially estopped from recovery in his personal injury claim. Id. at 455, 532 S.E.2d at
421-22; see also Byrd v. JRC Towne Lake, Ltd., 225 Ga. App. 506, 507,484 S.E.2d 309,310
(1997); Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga. App. 454, 455, 442 S.E.2d
265, 266 (1994) (noting that a party is estopped from asserting a position in a judicial
proceeding that is inconsistent with a position successfully asserted by it in a prior
proceeding).
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not been injured by Walker and Boyd. 226 The doctrine of judicial
estoppel, the court noted, required a showing that plaintiff's position in
a previous judicial proceeding had been successfully asserted.227 In
this instance, Smalls' claims that he was not injured in the subsequent
accident had been rejected by the AIU. 22' Additionally, the court
stated, Smalls' testimony with respect to whether or not he was injured
and disabled as a result of the May 1995 accident had been a matter of
his own personal belief.229 Because the proximate cause of his disability following both the job-related and nonjob-related accidents was a
"complex question," the court of appeals declined to find that Smalls
actually changed his position from one judicial proceeding to the next,
so that he would be precluded from recovery on that basis.23 °
0.

Statute of Limitations

In Mickens v. Western Probation Detention Center,23 ' the court of
appeals construed the statute of limitations contained in O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-82(a)," 2 regarding the time for filing a claim for compensation.233 Mickens had injured her leg in a 1995 fall and was paid
salary in lieu of benefits as well as medical benefits. She returned to
work and her five percent permanent partial disability ("PPD") rating
was commenced, with the final payment made on March 3, 1997. On
March 3, 1998, one year after she last received PPD benefits, but more
than one year after her compensable injury, she requested a hearing to
obtain benefits for a back injury that she claimed also occurred in her
on-the-job fall.234 At issue was whether the claim for the back injury
was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, or whether payment
of the PPD benefits had extended the statute of limitations to two years

226. 243 Ga. App. at 455, 532 S.E.2d at 422.
227. Id. at 456, 532 S.E.2d at 422.
228. Id. at 455-56, 532 S.E.2d at 422.
229. Id. at 456, 532 S.E.2d at 422-23.
230. Id.
231. 244 Ga. App. 268, 534 S.E.2d 927 (2000).
232. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (1998). That statute states:
The right to compensation shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within
one year after injury, except that if payment of weekly benefits has been made or
remedial treatment has been furnished by the employer on account of the injury
the claim may be filed within one year after the date of the last remedial
treatment furnished by the employer or within two years after the date of the last
payment of weekly benefits.
Id.
233.
234.

244 Ga. App. at 269, 534 S.E.2d at 928.
Id. at 268-69, 534 S.E.2d at 927-28.
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after the "date of the last payment of weekly benefits."235 The employer/insurer argued there should be no extension because PPD benefits
were not included in the term "weekly benefits" set forth in section 34-982(a).236
237
However, the court held the employee's claim was not time barred.
It reached this conclusion from a straightforward reading of the statute,
finding that the plain terms of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82(a) placed no
restrictions or specifications upon what kind of "weekly benefit" would
extend the statute of limitations. 23 8 Had the legislature intended some
limitation, the court stated, it certainly could have made that intent
clear in the statute.239 The court also pointed out that O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-263,24o which sets forth the employer/insurer's PPD
benefits obligations, expressly refers to those payments as "weekly
income benefits." 24' Thus, it was clear the payment of PPD benefits to
Mickens qualified as payment of weekly benefits so as to extend the
statute of limitations. In the wake of this decision, it will be equally
clear in most workers' compensation contexts that the payment of PPD
benefits will be construed by the Board and the courts to be no different
from payment of weekly income benefits under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-

26 1242 and 262.243
P. Subrogation
In Newsome v. Department of Administrative Services,24 the court
of appeals held that, under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1,245 it is the
statute of limitations applicable to a claimant's third-party cause of
action that controls an employer/insurer's subrogation claim.246
Stephens' workers' compensation insurer, the Georgia Department of
Administrative Services ("DOAS"), filed an action against Newsome in
Stephens' name, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(c), alleging

235. Id., 534 S.E.2d at 928.
236. Id. at 269, 534 S.E.2d at 928.
237. Id. at 268, 534 S.E.2d at 927.
238. Id. at 270, 534 S.E.2d at 929.
239. Id.
240. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 (1998).
241. 244 Ga. App. at 270, 534 S.E.2d at 929. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 (1998) states in
pertinent part, "In cases of permanent partial disability, the employer shall pay weekly
income benefits to the employee according to the schedule included in this Code section."
242. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (1998 & Supp. 2000).
243. Id. § 34-9-262.
244. 241 Ga. App. 357, 526 S.E.2d 871 (1999).
245. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (1998).
246. 241 Ga. App. at 358, 526 S.E.2d at 872-73.
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Newsome's negligence caused the injuries to Stephens for which DOAS
paid $45,000 in workers' compensation benefits. 247 The suit was filed,
however, more than two years after the date of the accident, and
therefore beyond the two-year statute of limitations for negligence
actions.248 However, DOAS argued the applicable statute of limitations was O.C.G.A. section 9-3-22,249 the so-called omnibus statute of
limitations that provides a twenty-year deadline within which to file
causes of action under statutes that do not otherwise have a limitation
period. °
Although the trial court denied Newsome's motion for summary
judgment, the court of appeals reversed. 251 The court concluded that
"it is clear that the Legislature intended that the asserting employer be
deemed an 'employee' for statute of limitation purposes and subject to
the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Stephens."252 The
court found this conclusion to be consistent with general concepts of
subrogation in which the subrogating party is essentially substituted for
another.25 3 The court also relied upon that portion of O.C.G.A. section
34-9-11.1 that provides the employer/insurer is "asserting the employee's
cause of action." 254 As a result, employers or insurers who choose to
file a cause of action under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(c) must be sure to
do so within the statute of limitations applicable to the claimant/employee.
Q.

Superior Court Judgments

It has long been axiomatic that the superior court, in entering
judgment on an award of the State Board of Workers' Compensation,
cannot change the Board's award. 255 The case of Ayers v. Rembert. 56
involved an interesting, and very limited, exception to that rule.
Rembert obtained an award from the ALJ holding his claim to be
compensable and granting him TTD and medical benefits along with
attorney fees. On appeal to both the appellate division and the superior
court, the ALJ's award was affirmed. When the employer did not pay
under the award, Rembert filed a petition with the superior court

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 357, 526 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at 358, 526 S.E.2d at 872.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (1982).
241 Ga. App. at 358, 526 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at 357, 526 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at 358, 526 S.E.2d at 873.
Id.
Id.
Wade v. Harris, 210 Ga. App. 882, 885, 437 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1993).
241 Ga. App. 698, 527 S.E.2d 290 (1999).
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seeking judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34L9-106.257
The
superior court entered judgment on the award, ordering Ayers to pay the
accrued TTD benefits, medical expenses, and attorney fees that were set
forth in the ALJ's award. The superior court also went a step further
and ordered Ayers to pay Rembert an additional penalty of twenty
percent on the overdue TTD benefits. 258 This penalty had not been
included in the ALJ's award. The court of appeals affirmed the
25 9
assessment of the late payment penalty.
At first glance, and under existing case law, the court of appeals'
affirmance might appear to be misguided. Indeed, Ayers argued the
superior court exceeded its statutory authority under O.C.G.A. section
34-9-106 by adding the twenty percent penalty to the Board's award.2 60
Normally, the court of appeals acknowledged, the superior court is
without power to change an award of the Board.26 1 In this particular
instance, however, the additional penalty was specifically authorized by
a statute, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(f), 26 2 which provides, in relevant
part: "If income benefits payable under the terms of an award are not
paid within 20 days after becoming due, there shall be added to the
accrued income benefits an amount equal to 20 percent thereof."
Penalties, the court reasoned, accrue automatically by operation of the
statute.2 3 Unlike the situation in which the superior court orders
payment of TTD benefits that had never been included in the underlying
Board award,2 the instant case involved superior court enforcement
of an award exactly as written, "in a manner consistent with the
265
underlying award of the [Bloard and in conformity with the Code."
Therefore, the superior court did not exceed its authority by including

257. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106 (1998). The relevant portion of the statute states:
Any party in interest may file in the superior court of the county in which the
injury occurred.., a certified copy of a... final order or decision of the members
or of an award of the members unappealed from or of an award of the members
affirmed upon appeal, whereupon the court shall render judgment in accordance
therewith and notify the parties.

Id.
258. 241 Ga. App. at 699, 527 S.E.2d at 292.
259. Id. at 701, 527 S.E.2d at 293.
260. Id. at 699, 527 S.E.2d at 292.
261. Id.
262. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(f) (1998 & Supp. 2000).
263. 241 Ga. App. at 699, 527 S.E.2d at 292.
264. See, e.g., Kingery Block & Concrete Co. v. Luttrell, 174 Ga. App. 481, 483, 330
S.E.2d 181, 183 (1985) (limiting power of superior court to enforcement of the final award
of the full board).
265. 241 Ga. App. at 701, 527 S.E.2d at 293.
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a statutorily mandated twenty percent late payment penalty in its
judgment.26 6

266.

Id.

*

*

*

